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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Petitioner, Maxwell Hoffman ("Hoffman"), appeals from the district court's 
summary dismissal of his successive post-conviction petition that was based, in part, 
upon the recantation of co-defendant Ronald Wages' ("Wages") trial testimony. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The facts leading to Hoffman's conviction for Denise Williams' first-degree 
murder and his death sentence are summarized in State v. Hoffman, 123 Idaho 638, 639-
41, 851 P.2d 934 (1993 ) (footnote omitted): 
[O]n September 10, 1987, Denise Williams (Williams), a confidential 
informant working for Nampa narcotic officers, made a controlled drug 
buy from Richard Holmes (Holmes) which resulted in the arrest of 
Holmes. During the arrest it became apparent that Williams was working 
for the police. Holmes was subsequently released from custody on bail. 
Upon Holmes' release, Sam Longstreet, Jr. (Longstreet) and James 
Slawson (Slawson) arranged for a meeting with Holmes. Longstreet and 
Slawson, who were responsible for introducing Williams to Holmes for 
the purpose of purchasing drugs, testified that they met with Holmes in an 
effort to assure him that they had nothing to do with his arrest. They 
further testified that when they arrived at Holmes' residence, two other 
men, defendant Hoffman and Ronald Wages (Wages), were present. Both 
Wages and Hoffman worked for Holmes as part of his drug operation, and 
both men were heavy drug users themselves. During this meeting, outside 
the presence of Hoffman and Wages, Holmes asked Longstreet and 
Slawson if they would kill Williams for her involvement in his arrest and 
to prevent her from testifying at Holmes' preliminary hearing on drug 
charges. Longstreet and Slawson stated that they were incapable of killing 
Williams but would help in other ways. In response, Holmes' [sic] stated 
that if it were up to him he would cut Williams' throat and "let her bleed 
like an animal." 
The next day, Longstreet and Slawson returned to Holmes' house. 
Hoffman and Wages were again present. Holmes had Hoffman conduct a 
strip search of Longstreet and Slawson to ensure that they were not wired 
and working for the police. During this meeting, an agreement was 
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reached between Holmes, Longstreet and Slawson wherein Longstreet and 
Slawson were to kidnap Williams and take her to a spot in Owyhee 
County known as the Boy Scout Camp. Holmes, Wages, Longstreet and 
Slawson then drove to the Boy Scout Camp where they planned the details 
of the kidnapping. It was agreed that Longstreet and Slawson would call 
Holmes once they had kidnapped Williams and that Wages would be 
waiting at the camp when they arrived. It was also agreed that Williams 
was to be tied up to a tree in the area until Holmes arrived. 
The following evening, Holmes and Hoffman took Wages to the 
Boy Scout Camp where they all ingested drugs. Holmes and Hoffman 
then left, leaving Wages at the Camp. Longstreet and Slawson arrived at 
the camp sometime later with Williams. Longstreet testified that he and 
Slawson tricked Williams into going with them by telling her that they 
would take her to buy alcohoL The three drove around drinking and 
ingesting drugs, stopping only once to allow Longstreet to call Holmes 
and leave a message that he had Williams. Longstreet and Slawson then 
pretended to get lost and eventually made their way to the Boy Scout 
Camp as was earlier planned. Upon their arrival at the camp, Wages, who 
was wearing a bandanna and carrying a sawed off shotgun, ordered 
Longstreet and Slawson to strip Williams of her clothes and to tie her up. 
The two men complied with Wages' order. Longstreet and Slawson then 
left the camp, leaving Williams with Wages. 
Hoffman arrived at the camp a short time later. Hoffman and 
Wages loaded Williams into a car and met Holmes at the old ION 
highway cutoff. Holmes kicked Williams in the head and told her she was 
"a dead bitch." Holmes left and subsequently returned in a brown Nissan 
four-wheel drive and told Hoffman and Wages, "You know what to do." 
Holmes then left again. 
Hoffman and Wages then took Williams in the Nissan. After 
driving around for several hours they stopped the vehicle in Delamar, 
Idaho. Wages and Hoffman instructed Williams to write two letters to the 
press, which were intended to exonerate Holmes of the drug charges. 
After the letters were written, Williams was taken to a cave outside of 
Silver City, Idaho. Hoffman took Williams into the cave and slashed her 
throat With a knife. As Hoffman was returning to the vehicle, Wages 
spotted Williams crawling up an embankment near the cave. Wages then 
pursued Williams and stabbed her under the arm with Hoffman's knife. 
Thinking Williams was dead, both men buried her with rocks. It would 
later be determined that the cause of death was a crushing blow by a rock 
to William's [sic] head. 
Upon William's [sic] disappearance, a police investigation ensued. 
Eventually, Longstreet and Slawson agreed to provide the police with 
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information regarding William's [sic] disappearance in exchange for a 
recommendation of a year in jail for kidnapping. Based on this 
information, Holmes and Wages were indicted on charges of conspiracy to 
commit murder. In an effort to secure a plea agreement, Holmes led the 
police to Williams' body. The conspiracy charges against Holmes were 
vacated, but Holmes was subsequently charged with aiding and abetting 
first degree murder on August 22, 1988. 
After Williams' body was found, Wages confessed to the killing 
and became a cooperative witness for the state and agreed to give a full 
account of how it occurred. Wages and Hoffman were then charged with 
first degree murder in Owyhee County. Hoffman went to preliminary 
hearing on September 14, 1988, where Wages was the principle witness 
for the State. Hoffman called Holmes as a witness, but Holmes refused to 
testify, claiming the fifth amendment right against self incrimination. 
After a jury trial, Hoffman was found guilty of Denise's first-degree murder. Id. 
at 641. A sentencing hearing was held with the district court finding two statutory 
aggravating factors: (1) the victim was a witness in a criminal proceeding; and (2) the 
murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity. Id. 
at 645-46. Hoffman was sentenced to death. Id. at 641. Hoffman then petitioned the 
district court for post-conviction relief, which the district court denied. Id. On January 
29, 1993, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Hoffman's conviction, death sentence, and 
the denial of post-conviction relief. Hoffman, supra. Certiorari was denied on March 28, 
1994. Hoffman v. Idaho, 511 U.S. 1012 (1994). 
Hoffman commenced federal habeas proceedings on May 2, 1994. Hoffman v. 
Arave, 73 F.Supp.2d 1192, 1194-95 (D. Idaho 1998). On July 7, 1995, while federal 
habeas proceedings were pending, Hoffman filed his first successive post-conviction 
petition, which was denied by the district court based on I.e. § 19-2719. Hoffman v. 
State, 142 Idaho 27, 28, 121 P.3d 958 (2005). Hoffman's subsequent appeal was 
dismissed by the Idaho Supreme Court on December 6, 1996. Id. 
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Hoffman's final habeas petition was filed April 2, 1996, raising fourteen claims. 
Hoffman, 73 F.Supp.2d at 1195. The federal district court dismissed several claims 
under the procedural default doctrine, including Hoffman's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims. Hoffman v. Arave, 973 F.Supp.1152 (D. Idaho 1997). The remaining 
habeas claims were dismissed on December 28, 1998. Hoffman, 73 F .Supp. 1192. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded I.C. § 19-2719 was not an adequate state 
law because the statute frustrated Hoffman's exercise of his ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claims when he was represented by the same attorney at trial, sentencing, post-
conviction, and appeal. Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 530-35 (9th Cir. 2001). 
Therefore, because the state district court denied Hoffman's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims without an evidentiary hearing and the Idaho Supreme Court and federal 
district court affirmed the denial of those claims on procedural grounds, the Ninth Circuit 
ordered the federal district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 536. The Ninth 
Circuit also found that Hoffman's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when 
his trial counsel was not permitted to attend the presentence interview. Id. at 538-41. 
However, because the court could not "adequately evaluate the impact of Hoffman's 
incriminating statements made during the presentence interview without the full body of 
mitigating and aggravating evidence considered at sentencing," the court remanded for a 
determination of whether the error was harmless. Id. at 541. The court affirmed the 
dismissal of Hoffman' s remaining claims. Id. at 541-43. 
On remand, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the federal district court 
rejected three of Hoffman's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, including that 
counsel: (1) failed to challenge Hoffman's competency; (2) advised Hoffman to reject a 
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plea agreement that would have foreclosed imposition of the death penalty; and (3) failed 
to investigate Hoffman's diminished capacity as a trial defense. Hoffman v. Arave, 455 
F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2006). However, the court granted sentencing relief based upon 
ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel "had not sufficiently investigated 
and presented mitigation evidence at sentencing that might have kept the trial judge from 
imposing a death sentence." rd. The court ordered the state to resentence Hoffman 
within 120 days. Id. at 930-31. While both parties initially appealed to the Ninth Circuit, 
the state subsequently withdrew its appeal leaving only two issues for the Ninth Circuit to 
address: (1) whether Hoffman was denied effective assistance of counsel during the guilt 
phase, including recommending a plea offer precluding the state from asking for the 
death penalty be rejected; and (2) various post-hearing motions. rd. at 931-32. 
With one exception, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal district court's 
rejection of Hoffman's guilt-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claims and post-
hearing motions. See Hoffman, 455 F.3d 926. However, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
trial counsel was ineffective in recommending rejection of the plea offer, id. at 939-42, 
and ordered Hoffman's release unless the state offered him "a plea agreement with the 
'same material terms' offered in the original plea agreement," id. at 943. The Supreme 
Court granted the state's petition for certiorari. Arave v. Hoffman, 552 U.S. 1008 (2007). 
However, because Hoffman subsequently "abandon [ ed] his claim that counsel was 
ineffective during plea bargaining" and "no longer [sought] or desire[d] the relief ordered 
by the Court of Appeals with respect to the plea offer," his Motion to Vacate Decision 
Below and Dismiss the Cause as Moot was granted. Arave v. Hoffman, 552 U.S. 117, 
118 (2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, the Ninth Circuit 
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ordered the federal district court to dismiss with prejudice Hoffman's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel during plea bargaining. Hoffman v. Arave, 518 F.3d 656 (9th Cir. 
2008). Because Hoffman was still entitled to sentencing relief stemming from ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the state was ordered to proceed with his resentencing. Id. 
During the pendency of his appeal, Hoffman filed his second successive post-
conviction petition based upon Ring v. Arizona 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Hoffman v. State, 
142 Idaho 27, 28, 121 P.3d 958 (2005). Based upon I.C. § 19-2719, the district court 
dismissed Hoffman's petition. Hoffman, 142 Idaho at 28-29. The state filed a motion to 
dismiss Hoffman's appeal, which the Idaho Supreme Court granted on September 14, 
2005. Id. at 29-30. 
On remand, an extensive sentencing was held lasting several days with both 
parties calling multiple witnesses (#35941, Tr., pp.1-566),1 including Wages who 
recanted statements he previously gave to police and his prior testimony (id., pp.373-90, 
4l3-53).2 Wages testified Denise's murder was committed by himself and Holmes while 
Hoffman was home babysitting. (Id., pp.375, 379, 387-88, 413, 428-36, 446.) Wages 
refused to answer some questions from the state during cross-examination. (Id., p.415.) 
I While the Idaho Supreme Court has already granted Hoffman's Motion to Take Judicial 
Notice, it appears the court only granted the motion with respect to that portion of the 
resentencing held on October 30, 2008. In an abundance of caution and to avoid any 
confusion, the state has filed a Motion to Take Judicial Notice, contemporaneously with 
this brief, asking the court to take judicial notice of the entirety of the resentencing 
hearing contained in four volumes of transcript. The state will refer to the respective 
records and transcripts by their Idaho Supreme Court numbers and to Hoffman's opening 
brief as "Brief." 
2 Because Wages' prior testimony is not part of the record on appeal, it is unknown 
exactly how different his resentencing testimony was from his prior testimony. 
Nevertheless, the district court concluded, "it's uncontested that Mr. Wages has changed 
his story. I mean, that's not a contested fact. And that that was presented at the 
sentencing hearing." (#35941, Tr., p.50.) 
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Rather than strike Wages' testimony, the district court explained the refusal would "go to 
the weight and credibility issues," particularly since he was "currently serving a life 
sentence." (Id.) 
After hearing all the evidence, the district court explained, "I don't find Mr. 
Wages' testimony at this hearing to be remotely credible or believable." (Id., p.553.) 
Discussing additional evidence from Hoffman's trial that supports his involvement (id., 
pp.553-54), the court further found, "Wages' testimony, and portions of his recanting and 
contending that Mr. Hoffman was not even there, to fly in the face of credibility" (id., 
p.556) and that Hoffman "played a significant role" in Denise's murder (id., p.557). 
Even though the state had decided not to seek the death penalty at Hoffman's 
resentencing (id., p.553), the district court found the same two statutory aggravating 
factors: (1) "the crime itself was especially heinous and cruel," and (2) Denise was killed 
because she was a state's witness in Holmes' upcoming criminal proceedings (id., p.558). 
On October 30, 2008, the district court sentenced Hoffman to fixed life for Denise's first-
degree murder. (Id., p.564.) 
Hoffman's sentence and denial of his subsequent Rule 35 motion were affirmed 
by the Idaho Court of Appeals on December 1,2009. State v. Hoffman, #35941, slip op. 
(Idaho Ct. App. 2009) (unpublished). The Remittitur was filed February 2, 2010. 
(Appendix B.) 
Hoffman filed a pro se Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction Relief on 
September 30, 2010, raising three claims: (1) actual innocence; (2) inetIective assistance 
of counsel; and (3) "prosecutorial and law enforcement misconduct"; no factual 
allegations supported his claims. (R., pp.5-10.) The state filed an answer asserting, 
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among other defenses, that the petition was untimely because it "attack [ ed] the 
underlying conviction." CR., pp.11-14.) Counsel was appointed and filed an amended 
petition incorporating "each of the allegations and claims contained in [Hoffman's] pro 
se Petition" and contending Hoffman's sentence is "cruel and unusual punishment" and 
"there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard by the jury, 
that requires [sic] vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice," including 
"statements and testimony of Ronald Wage [sic]. CR., pp.22-25.) After the state filed 
another answer (R., pp.26-28), the district court filed a Notice of Intent to Issue Summary 
Dismissal except the two claims involving Wages' testimony (R., pp.29-37). Hoffman 
did not respond to the court's Notice and, with the exception of the claims involving 
Wages' testimony, Hoffman's remaining claims were dismissed. CR. pp.56-57.) 
The state filed a Motion for Summary Disposition. (R., pp.38-40.) In addition to 
responding to the state's motion (R., pp.43-47), Hoffman filed a motion to have a private 
investigator appointed to find and interview witnesses listed on an Affidavit of Richard 
Hays, an investigator with the Capital Habeas Unit of the Federal Defenders who 
represented Hoffman during federal habeas proceedings CR., pp.48-55). Hays' affidavit, 
which was signed September 19, 2000, averred he interviewed Wages on March 28, 
2000, and Wages recanted his testimony and signed an affidavit so stating. CR., pp.53-
55.) After interviewing Wages, Hays attempted to corroborate Wages' recantation by 
interviewing other people. (Id.) At a hearing on Hoffman's motion, the district court 
raised the issue of timeliness, noting Hoffman filed two post-conviction petitions since 
Hays' affidavit was signed in 2000. (#39553, Tr., pp.14-22.) Addressing the courts' 
concern, Hoffman contended the "newly discovered evidence was not shored up until Mr. 
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Wages came into this courtroom and testified at the resentencing under oath." (Id., p.1S.) 
The court denied Hoffman's request for investigative services and ordered the parties to 
address the timeliness issue regarding Wages' recantation. (Id., pp.24-26.) 
After the parties filed their respective responses to the court's order, which 
included an affidavit from Hoffman (R., pp.64-7S), and hearing argument from counsel 
(#39553, Tr., pp.33-43), the district court dismissed Hoffman's two remaining claims 
based upon Wages' recantation because they were guilt-phase claims that were not timely 
filed since Hoffman was aware of Wages' recantation no later than 2000 when he was 
interviewed by Hays (id., pp.43-57; R., pp.79-S0). Hoffman filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal on January 5, 2012. (R., pp.S2-S4.) After a short remand, final Judgment was 
filed November 21,2012. (Appendix C.) 
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ISSUE 
Hoffman has phrased the issue on appeal as follows: 
Whether the district court erred when it summarily denied post conviction 
relief by holding that the successive petition was not timely filed. 
(Brief, p.8.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as follows: 
Because Wages recanted during his interview with Hays on March 28, 2000, has 
Hoffman failed to establish his successive post-conviction petition was timely filed when 
it was not filed until September 30, 2010, more than ten years after he knew or 
reasonably should have known of Wages' recantation to Hays? 
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ARGUMENT 
Hoffman's Successive Petition Was Untimely Because It Was Filed More Than 42 Days 
After The Recantation Claims Were Known Or Reasonably Could Have Been Known 
A. Introduction 
Although he raised several claims in his pro se Petition and Affidavit for Post-
Conviction Relief (R., pp.5-10) and Verified Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief (id., pp.22-25), Hoffman challenges only the dismissal of his two guilt-phase 
claims stemming from Wages' recantation, which the district court found were untimely 
because they were not filed within a reasonable time after Wages' recantation was known 
or reasonably should have been known (Brief, pp.16-21). Hoffman concedes the claims 
stemming from Wages' recantation involve a successive petition and the facts regarding 
the recantation were known no later than March 28, 2000, when Hays interviewed 
Wages. Nevertheless, Hoffman contends whether the claims were "timely raised must 
necessarily include an analysis of whether there was sufficient reason for raising [them] 
in the instant petition rather than an earlier one" (Brief, p.17) and, because "there is no 
evidence showing that Mr. Hoffman could have effectively forced his attorneys to earlier 
bring the claim" or "anything controverting that Mr. Hoffman filed his pro se petition as 
soon as he could have given his mental retardation and limited abilities" (id., p.19), his 
claims were timely filed more than ten years after Hays' interview. 
The state requests that this Court modify the "reasonable time" standard for filing 
successive petitions in non-capital cases and adopt the 42-day standard established by the 
Idaho Supreme Court for filing successive petitions in capital cases from Pizzuto v. State, 
146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 P.3d 642 (2008). Irrespective, Hoffman has failed to establish 
any basis for not earlier raising the claims associated with Wages' 2000 recantation. 
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Hoffman's filing of the successive pro se petition on September 30, 2010, demonstrates 
he could have filed the same petition within a reasonable time after learning of Wages' 
recantation, not more than ten years after Hays' interview. Therefore, Hoffman has failed 
to establish the district court erred by dismissing his "recantation claims" because they 
were not timely filed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The applicability of a statute of limitation to an action under a given set of facts is 
a question of law subject to free review on appeal. State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245, 
796 P.2d 121 (1990); Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 
2008); Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 627, 628, 836 P.2d 1088 (Ct. App. 1992). An 
appellate court will defer to the factual findings made by the district court unless they are 
clearly erroneous, requiring Hoffman to establish the court's factual findings are "not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record." Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 
138 Idaho 76, 82 P.3d 787 (2002); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 256, 869 P.2d 571 
(Ct. App. 1994). However, this Court exercises free review over the application of the 
relevant law to those facts. Gabourie, 125 Idaho at 256. 
C. Applicable Post-Conviction Legal Standards 
Although Hoffman's case started as a capital murder case, after his resentencing 
to fixed life in 2008, "it became a non-capital case" and is now governed by the Uniform 
Post-Conviction Procedures Act ("UP CPA"), including I.C. §§ 19-4902 and 19-4908, 
"which govern the timeliness of petitions for post-conviction relief in non-capital cases." 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870 (2007). 
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'" [PJetitions for post-conviction relief are civil proceedings governed by the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure.'" Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642 (2008) 
(quoting Storm v. State, 112 Idaho 718, 720, 735 P.2d 1029 (1987)). "Like the plaintiff 
in a civil case, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations 
upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based." State v. Yakovac, 146 Idaho 
437,443, 180 P.3d 476 (2008). 
However, a post-conviction petition differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil 
action because the petition must contain much more than "a short and plain statement of 
the claim." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376 (2004). "The application 
must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the 
application will be subject to dismissal." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 
123 (2008). Bare or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate 
to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 
715 P.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1986); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 826, 702 P.2d 860 (Ct. 
App. 1985). The district court may also take judicial notice of the records, transcripts and 
exhibits from the underlying criminal case. Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736, 739, 747 P.2d 
758 (Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 115 Idaho 315, 766 P.2d 895 (1988), overruled on other 
grounds, State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992); Matthews v. State, 122 
Idaho 801, 808, 839 P.2d 1215 (1992). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906( c) states, "The court may grant a motion by either party for 
summary disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any 
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party 
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is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." "Summary dismissal of an application is the 
procedural equivalent of summary judgment under LR.C.P. 56." Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 
444. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present 
evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278 
(2003). "A 'prima facie case' means the 'production of enough evidence to allow the 
fact-finder to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party's favor.'" Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 
728 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1209 (Bryan A. Garner ed., i h ed., West 1999)). 
"However, summary dismissal may be appropriate even where the State does not 
controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is not required to accept either the 
applicant's merely conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the 
applicant's conclusions of law." Payne, 146 Idaho at 561 (internal quotes and citations 
omitted); see also Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925 (2010). 
"These standards apply equally to questions regarding the accrual of actions and 
the passage of the statute of limitations." Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 
1066 (2009). 
D. Hoffman Has Failed To Establish His Recantation Claims Are Timely 
1. The "Reasonable Time" Standard Should Be Modified To 42 Days After 
The Claim Is Known Or Reasonably Should Have Been Known 
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) establishes the statute of limitation for filing a post-
conviction petition as follows, "An application may be filed at any time within one (l) 
year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or 
from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." "The 
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'appeal' referenced in that section means the appeal in the underlying criminal case." 
Gonzales v. State, 139 Idaho 384, 385, 79 P.3d 743 (Ct. App. 2003). "[T]he limitation 
period begins to run, after an unsuccessful appeal, when the Idaho Supreme Court or the 
Idaho Court of Appeals issues a remittitur." Cochran v. State, 133 Idaho 205, 207, 984 
P.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Idaho Code § 19-4908 governs the filing of succeSSIve non-capital post-
conviction petitions and establishes new claims "may not be the basis for a subsequent 
application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason 
was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended 
application." While "[t]here is no time limit set forth in these statutes regarding the filing 
of a subsequent petition," the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized I.C. § 19-4908 
"contemplates there may be circumstances under which a successive petition may be filed 
if the trial court finds a claim for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately 
raised in the original petition" or the new claim was not known to the petitioner within 
the one-year limitation period, "yet raises important due process issues." Charboneau, 
144 Idaho at 904. After examining I.e. § 19-2719 and the timeliness of successive post-
conviction petitions in capital cases, the supreme court "applied the same 'reasonable 
time' standard that governs its examination of post-conviction petitions in capital cases" 
to non-capital cases and concluded, "In determining what a reasonable time is for filing a 
successive petition, we will simply consider it on a case-by-case basis, as has been done 
in capital cases." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904-05. Absent a showing that the 
limitations period should be tolled, the failure to timely file a petition for post-conviction 
relief - whether within the one-year period of I.C. § 19-4902 or within a reasonable time 
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of the discovery of new claims - is a basis for dismissal of the petition. Rhoades, 148 
Idaho 727; Evensioskyv. State, 136 Idaho 189, 191,30 PJd 967 (2001). 
Subsequent to Charboneau, the Idaho Supreme Court significantly modified the 
"reasonable time" standard in capital cases. In Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727,202 
P.3d 642 (2008), the supreme court recognized in Dunlap v. State, 131 Idaho 576, 961 
P.2d 1179 (1998), a petition filed within forty-two days after the claim was known or 
reasonably should have been known was a reasonable time, while in Rhoades v. State, 
135 Idaho 299, 17 P.3d 243 (2000), a six-month delay in filing a successive petition was 
not a reasonable time. Based upon the "reference to the forty-two day time limit in 
Dunlap," the supreme court concluded: 
[A] reasonable time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction 
relief is forty-two days after the petitioner knew or reasonably should have 
known of the claim, unless the petitioner shows that there were 
extraordinary circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the 
claim within that time period. In that event, it still must be filed within a 
reasonable time after the claim was known or knowable. 
Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 727. 
The supreme court has recognized the reasonable time standard in capital cases is 
not statutorily based, but is premised upon the court's "construction of statutory language 
barring claims that a defendant knew or reasonably should have known within 42 days 
after judgment was filed." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Likewise, the reasonable time 
standard in non-capital cases is not statutorily based, but is based, in part, upon the 
recognition that the district court's "analysis of 'sufficient reason' permitting the filing of 
a successive petition must necessarily include an analysis of whether the claims being 
made were asserted within a reasonable period of time." Id. at 905. In other words, the 
reasonable time standard in non-capital cases is also based upon construction of statutory 
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language barring claims that a defendant knew or reasonably should have known within 
one year after the Remittitur is issued. Moreover, although not raised by Hoffman, 
Pizzuto raised a concern regarding whether the "reasonable time" requirement is 
"unconstitutionally vague because it is determined after the fact and does not give a 
petitioner adequate advance notice of when the petition must be filed." Pizzuto, 146 
Idaho at 727. Undoubtedly, this argument will also be raised in a non-capital case. 
Therefore, because the reasonable time standard in non-capital cases is premised, at least 
in part, upon the reasonable time standard in capital cases and the standard in capital 
cases has been modified, and to provide non-capital petitioners clear guidance regarding 
when successive petitions are due, the state requests that this Court adopt the 42-day 
limitation period from Pizzuto as the standard for filing successive petitions in non-
capital cases. 
Applying the 42-day standard, Hoffman's petition was untimely. As 
demonstrated by Hays' affidavit CR., pp.53-55), Hoffman knew or reasonably should 
have known of Wages' recantation when Wages was interviewed by Hays on March 28, 
2000. "Wages gave a longer, more detailed affidavit to Joan Fisher on May 15, 2000." 
CR., p.53.) Yet, no one, including Hoffman, raised a claim regarding the recantation until 
September 30, 2010, when Hoffman filed his pro se petition. CR., pp.5-10.) While Hays 
contended that from March 28, 2000, through September 19, 2000, he "[tried] to find 
people who could corroborate Mr. Wages' affidavits" CR., p.54), there was no reason to 
delay filing of the claims for corroboration. As explained in Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 
905, timeliness is measured "from the date of notice, not from the date a petitioner 
assembles a complete cache of evidence." Even providing Hoffman every conceivable 
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doubt regarding the time for filing the recantation claims, the underlying facts regarding 
those claims were known no later than the day of Wages' testimony at the resentencing 
hearing - October 29, 2008. (#35941, Tr., pp.373-90.) However, Hoffinan's pro se 
petition was not filed until September 30, 2010 (R., pp.5-1O), nearly two years after 
Wages' recantation, and his amended petition was not filed until February 1, 2011 (R., 
pp.22-25). 
Hoffinan has also failed to establish "extraordinary circumstances that prevented 
him ... from filing the claim[s] within that time period." Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 727. 
Hoffinan apparently contends his claims were timely filed because he was "no longer 
represented by death penalty attorneys whose primary focus ... was getting him off death 
row," "there was no evidence showing that Mr. Hoffinan could have effectively forced 
his attorneys to earlier bring the claim instead of simply focusing on reasons why he 
could or should not be executed," and there is allegedly nothing "controverting that Mr. 
Hoffman filed his pro se petition as soon as he could have given his mental retardation 
and limited abilities including his difficulties in reading and in understanding his case." 
(Brief, p.19.) These excuses do not constitute "extraordinary circumstances." 
The state is unaware of Idaho's appellate courts having defined "extraordinary 
circumstances" in the context of filing a successive post-conviction petition. The Idaho 
Court of Appeals discussed "extraordinary circumstances" in the context of equitable 
tolling in Chico-Rodriguez v. State, 141 Idaho 576, 582, 114 P.3d 137 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(citing Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003); Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 
310, 320 (3 rd Cir. 2001); Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (loth Cir. 2000)), 
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explaining other courts have concluded it must be something beyond the petitioner's 
control and more than excusable neglect. As the court explained: 
These cases illustrate the bar for equitable tolling for post-
conviction actions is high. It is not enough to show that compliance was 
simply made more difficult on account of a mental condition. We hold 
that in order for the statute of limitation under the UPCP A to be tolled on 
account of a mental illness, an unrepresented petitioner must show that he 
suffered from a serious mental illness which rendered him incompetent to 
understand his legal right to bring an action within a year or otherwise 
rendered him incapable of taking necessary steps to pursue that right. 
Should this Court adopt this standard for purposes of successive petitions, 
Hoffman has failed to meet his burden. First, assuming there is any merit to the 
allegation that Hoffman could not force his prior attorneys to bring the recantation 
claims, that argument fails because he was represented by new counsel during the appeal 
of his new sentence and the denial of Rule 35 relief. On March 19, 2009, the State 
Appellate Public Defender was appointed to represent Hoffman after his resentencing and 
denial of Rule 35 relief (Appendix A); Greg S. Silvey represented Hoffman on appeal. 
See State v. Hoffman, #35941, slip op., p.1 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009) (unpublished) (noting 
Hoffman was represented by Greg S. Silvey). Yet, Hoffman waited more than eighteen 
months after being appointed a new attorney on March 19,2009, and filing his successive 
petition on September 30, 2010. Even if the date is calculated from the issuance of the 
Remittitur on February 2, 2010, when Hoffman was no longer represented by an attorney, 
he took nearly eight months to file his successive claims. 
Second, there is nothing in Hoffman's affidavit explaining why his alleged 
"mental retardation and limited abilities" prevented him from filing his petition within 42 
days after they were known or reasonably should have been knovvn. (R., pp.67-69.) 
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Hoffman concedes he "dropped [his] appeals and other legal avenues to challenge [his] 
conviction on several occasions" (R., p.68), obviously demonstrating his knowledge of 
the criminal justice system and ability to file pleadings to coerce those involved in his 
case, including his appointed attorneys. 
Finally, there is nothing complex about the pro se petition Hoffman filed. (R., 
pp.5-10.) It is a "fill-in-the-blank" form that was apparently completed by Hoffman, who 
signed the petition, had it properly verified, and had it sent to the Owyhee County 
Prosecutor and Clerk. (Id.) Irrespective of whether he does not "possess a high LQ.," 
has "difficulty reading and understanding much of what goes on in [his] court cases," or 
"mental retardation" (R., pp.67-68), Hoffman completed this simple form and had it 
properly filed. There is nothing in Hoffman's affidavit or anywhere else in the record 
supporting the notion that this form could not have been filed within 42 days of the 
claims being known or when they reasonably should have been known even if the date 
starts from issuance of the Remittitur when he was no longer represented by counsel. 
Even giving Hoffman the benefit of starting his statute of limitation from issuance 
of the Remittitur on February 2,2010, Hoffman did not timely file the recantation claims 
within 42 days after they were known or reasonably should have been known. Therefore, 
the district court's decision to dismiss the recantation claims because they were not 
timely filed must be affirmed. 
2. Under The Current "Reasonable Time" Standard, Hoffman's Recantation 
Claims Were Not Timely Filed 
Even if this Court rejects the state's request to modify the reasonable time 
standard in non-capital cases, Hoffman's claims were not timely filed. As detailed above, 
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there is no reason for the inordinate delay in filing the petition on September 30, 2010, 
more than ten years after Wages was interviewed by Hays on March 28,2000, nearly two 
years after Wages' recantation at Hoffman's resentencing on October 29, 2008, more 
than eighteen months after he was appointed new counsel on March 19,2009, and nearly 
eight months after the Remittitur issued on February 2, 2010, from his last appeal. In 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 701, 992 P.2d 144 (1999), the court noted if a claim 
could not have been known when the first petition for post-conviction relief was filed, 
"[the court] has required the petitioner to assert the issue soon after the issue is known." 
The Idaho Supreme Court refined the reasonable time standard in Rhoades v. State, 135 
Idaho 299, 301, 17 P.3d 243, 245 (2000), concluding the petitioner failed to show 
"justifiable reason for the six-month delay in filing" a successive post-conviction petition. 
Even giving Hoffman the benefit of starting his limitation period from issuance of 
the Remittitur on February 2, 2010, after he was no longer represented by counsel, his 
successive petition was filed well beyond the six month limitation period in Rhoades, 
which the Idaho Supreme Court determined was not a "reasonable time." Moreover, as 
detailed above, he has failed to establish any reason, let alone a 'justifiable reason" or 
extraordinary circumstances, for waiting so long to file his successive petition. 
Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the recantation claims in Hoffman's 
successive petition. 
21 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the district court's denial of Hoffman's post-
conviction petition be affirmed. 
DATED this 29th day of November, 201~. 
Deputy Attorney eneral 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on or about the 29th day of November, 2012, I caused 
to be serviced a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated 
below, postage prepaid where applicable, and addressed to the following: 
Greg S. Silvey 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 565 
Star, ID 83669 
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ORDER APPOINTING STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER IN 
DIRECT APPEAL 
-vs- Case No. CR 1988-4843 
MAXWELL A. HOFFMAN, 
Defendant! Appellant. 
TO: IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
The above named defendant-appellant having been convicted of Murder 
in the First Degree, and having been re-sentenced on October 30, 2008, as 
follows: committed to the Idaho State Board of Corrections for a term of life 
without parole. 
The defendant-appellant having requested the assistance of counsel in 
pursuing a direct appeal from the judgment and commitment and the Court's 
Denial of Rule 35 Motion for Reduction of Sentence, and the Court being 
satisfied that said defendant-appellant is an indigent person entitled to the 
ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE 
PUBLIC DEFENDER IN DIRECT APPEAL SCANNED 
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( 
services of the State Appellate Public Defender pursuant to Idaho Code §19-870 
and that the appeal is from an order enumerated in Idaho Code §19-870(1), and 
good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER that the State 
Appellate Public Defender is appointed to represent the above named defendant-
appellant on the appeal from the Court's Order Denying Rule 35 motion for 
reduction of sentence entered in this case on the 9th day of July, 2008. 
The State Appellate Public Defender's Office is provided the following 
information concerning this case: 
1. The defendanUappellantCs attorney was: Teresa A. Hampton, PO Box 
1352, Boise, ID 83701. 
Dated this --5.--day of March, 2009. 
i 
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ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE 
PUBLIC DEFENDER IN DIRECT APPEAL 
regory M. CulE7 
District Judge 
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either by depositing the same in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid, or by 
personal service. 
Dated this day of March, 2009.CHARLOTTE SHERBURN 
WilIiam11tlrst, Clerk 
Clerk of District Court 
Deputy Clerk 
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In the Court of Appeals of the State of Idaho 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
MAXWELL A. HOFFMAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
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) 
REMITTITUR 
Supreme Court Docket No. 35941 
District Court Case No. 1988-4843 
TO: THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF OWYHEE. 
The Court having announced its unpublished Opinion in this cause December 1, 
2009, and having denied Appellant's Petition for Review on January 29,2010; therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the District Court shall forthwith comply with 
the directive of the unpublished Opinion, if any action is required. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 2010. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge 
Clerk of the Court ~f Appeals 
STATE OF IDAHO 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF Deputy Clerk 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
----'---'--------------r---- ----,---
I -all) .J.':-MAXWELL HOFFMAN, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
I Case No. CV ~-1718 
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FINAL JUDGMENT 
On December 20, 2011, following memorandum submitted by counsel, oral 
argument and hearing, Gregory M. Cutet, District Judge granted the State's Motion for 
Summary Disposition, thereby dismissing the Post Conviction Relief Petition of Maxwell 
Hoffman. 
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54(a) and 58(a), this court hereby enters this 
Final Judgment dismissing Petitioners Post Conviction Relief Petition. 
DATED this 20th day of November, 2012. 
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I the undersigned hereby certify that on the d/~ day of November, 2012, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the preceding FINAL JUDGMENT in the above 
referenced matter to be sent via the method indicated below to: 
Douglas D. Emery 
Owyhee County Prosecuting Attorney 
Owyhee County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 128 
Murphy, Idaho 83650 
Tyler Rounds 
Attorney for Maxwell Hoffman 
Lovan, Raker and Rounds 
717 S. Kimball, Ste 200 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
__ United States Mail; postage pre-paid 
...-Hand delivery 
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